Plan of War
Doctrine of War
Know the Enemy
Essence of War
The End Justifies
Predator v. Prey
Art of War
Zone of Operations
Plan of Strategy
Plan of Tactics
Principle of War
Mass of forces
Defender v. Attacker
Concept of War
Center of Gravity
Principle of Concentration of
Ownership of Land
The Art of War.
SUN TZU said:
"All warfare is based on deception."1a
" . . . [T]here has never been
a protracted war from which a country has benefited."1b
"Your aim must be to take
All-under-Heaven intact. Thus your troops are not worn out
and your gains will be complete. This is the art of offensive
"Invincibility lies in
the defence; the possibility of victory in the attack."1d
"There are occasions when the
commands of the sovereign need not be obeyed."1e
"By taking into account the favourable
factors, [the wise general] makes his plan feasible; by
taking into account the unfavourable, he may resolve the
"It is a doctrine of war not
to assume the enemy will not come, but rather to rely on one's readiness
to meet him; not to presume that he will not attack, but
rather to make one's self invincible."1g
"In war, numbers alone confer
no advantage. Do not advance relying on sheer military power."1h
". . . 'Know the enemy,
know yourself; your victory will never be endangered. .
"Speed is the
essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness;
travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no
"Now the reason the
enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever
they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge."1k
"Delicate indeed! Truly
delicate! There is no place where espionage is not used."1l
The Peloponnesian War.
. . . Archidamus their king, a man
reputed both wise and temperate, spake as followeth.
' . . . war is not so much war of arms
as war of money by means whereof arms are useful, especially when
it is a war of land men against sea men. . . .
. . . Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians, . . . called
together the commanders of the several cities and such as were in
authority and most worthy to be present and spake unto them as
' . . . For the accidents of war are
uncertain, . . . And oftentimes the lesser number, being afraid,
hath beaten back the greater with the more ease; for that through
contempt they have gone unprepared. . . '"1b
. . . Pericles the son of Xantippus, who with nine others
was general of the Athenians, . . . advised them concerning the
business in hand . . . ' . . . that
the victory in war consisted wholly in counsel and
store of money.'"1c
. . . he that is wronged without cause and escapeth will commonly
be more cruel than if it were against any enemy on equal quarrel.
. . '
To this purpose spake Cleon."1d
. . . either some greater terror than death must be devised, or
death will not be enough for coercion. For poverty will always add
boldness to necessity; and wealth, covetousness to pride and
contempt. . . '
Thus spake Diodotus."1e
. . . democracy is a name of the whole, oligarchy
but of a part. . . in the oligarchy they allow indeed to the
multitude a participation of all dangers, but in matters of
profit, they not only encroach upon the multitude, but take from
them and keep the whole. . . But yet, O ye the most unwise of all
men, unless you know that what you affect is evil, and if you know
not that, you are the most ignorant of all the Grecians I know;
or, ye most wicked of all men, if knowing it you dare do this. . .
Thus said Athenagoras."1f
" . . . [T]he conqueror must arrange to commit all his
cruelties at once . . . "1a
" . . . [A prince] must
abstain from taking the property of others, for men forget
more easily the death of their father than the loss of their
" . . . [I]t is necessary . . . to be a great feigner and
dissembler; and men are so simple and so ready to obey present
necessities, that one who deceives will always find those who
allow themselves to be deceived."1d
" . . . [I]n the actions of
men . . . from which there is no appeal, the end justifies
"Money . . . not only
affords you no protection, but makes you the sooner fall a
prey. . . it is not gold, as is acclaimed by common opinion,
that constitutes the sinews of war, but good soldiers; for gold
does not find good soldiers, but good soldiers are quite
capable of finding gold."2c
" . . . [A] prince who wishes
to do great things must learn to practice deceit."2d
" . . . [N]othing is more
essential or more useful to a general than to discover what the
enemy has decided and is planning to do."2e
. . . [A]s an instrument in the struggle among powers, the credit system -- the ingenious invention of a
commercial people [England] during this century -- of endlessly
growing debts that remain safe against immediate demand (since the
demand for payment is not made by all creditors at the same time)
a dangerous financial power.
It is a war
chest exceeding the treasure of all other nations taken
together . . . This ease in making war, combined with the
inclination of those in power to do so . . . is a great obstacle to
perpetual peace. Thus, forbidding
foreign debt must be a preliminary article for perpetual peace . . . "1
The Art of War.
art of war, as generally
considered, consists of five purely military branches,--viz.:
Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics,
Engineering, and Tactics. A sixth and essential
branch, hitherto unrecognized, might be termed
Diplomacy in its relation to War."1a*
. . . Strategy
is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole
theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of posting
troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the
ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon
the ground . . . Logistics comprises the means and
arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics.
Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the
troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of
execution and the employment of the troops."1b
" . . .
[T]here is one great principle
underlying all the operations of war, . . . It is embraced in
the following maxims:--
To throw by strategic movements the
mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive
points of a theater of war, and also upon the
communications of the enemy as much as possible without
compromising one's own.
To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile
army with the bulk of one's forces.
On the battle-field, to throw the mass
of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that
portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance
To so arrange that these masses
shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they
shall engage at the proper times and with
" . . . [W]ar is nothing but the continuation
of policy with other means."1a*
is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."1b*
. . . [O]ne may appeal to genius, which is above all rules;
which amounts to admitting that rules are not only made for idiots, but are idiotic in themselves."1c
is the object of defense? Preservation. It is easier to hold
ground than take it. . . defense is the stronger form of waging
"The only advantage the attacker
possesses is that he is free to strike at any point . . . and
in full force: the defender, on the other
hand, is able to surprise his opponent constantly
throughout the engagement by the strength and direction of his
"[T]he concept of war does not originate with the attack, because the
ultimate object of attack is not fighting: rather, it is
The idea of war originates with the defense . . . "1f
"Not by taking things the easy way . . . but by
constantly seeking out the center of his power, but
by daring all to win all, will one really defeat the
"The principle of
aiming everything at the enemy's
center of gravity
admits of only one exception -- that is, when secondary operations
look exceptionally rewarding. . .
The first task, then, in planning for a war is to identify
the enemy's centers of gravity, and, if possible
trace them back to a single one.
The second task is to ensure that the forces to be used against
that point are concentrated for a main offensive."1h*
the Art of War: Selected Writings.
peace is a dream, and not even a pleasant one.
War is a
part of God's world order."1a
"The money market also has today
gained an influence that can call the armed forces into the field
for its interest. European armies have occupied Mexico and Egypt
to meet the demands of high finance."1b
"The best guarantee of success of an
attack over the defense lies in a flanking attack and
the simultaneous advance of all our forces against the enemy's
flank and front."1c
. . . The tactical defense is the
stronger, the strategic offensive the more effective
form -- and the only one that leads to the goal."1d
"One must distinguish between the
object of the war and the object of the operation
of the attack. The former is not the army, but the land
mass and the capital of the enemy, and within them the
resources and the political power of the state. It
comprises what we desire to hold or that for which we will
subsequently trade. The object of an operation is the hostile
army insofar as it defends the object of the war."1e*
"The course of a war
must keep the means that tactics require in readiness at the
proper time and place. . .
Strategy governs the movements of the army for
the planned battle; the manner of execution is the
province of tactics. The former issues directives, the
. . .
[O]nly the destruction of the
hostile fighting force will be decisive as a rule. It is
therefore the most important object of all operations."1h
NON-CO-OPERATION AND CIVIL
"Europe is no better for
Germanyï¿½s fall. The Allies have proved themselves to be
just as deceitful, cruel, greedy and
selfish as Germany was or would have been."1c
"I know that
withholding of payment of taxes is one of the quickest
methods of overthrowing a government. I am equally sure
that we have not yet evolved that degree of strength and
discipline which are necessary for conducting a
successful campaign of non-payment of taxes. . . Non-payment of
taxes without the necessary discipline will be an act of
of taxes is indeed the last stage in non-co-operation.
We must not resort to it till we have tried the other forms of
On Guerilla Warfare
(Yu Chi Chan).
political goal, guerilla warfare must fail, as it must if
its political objectives do not coincide with the
aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation, and
assistance cannot be gained.
The essence of guerilla
warfare is thus revolutionary in character."1a
"What is basic
guerilla strategy? Guerilla strategy must be based
primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. . .
In guerilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come
from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the
solid, attack the hollow; attack, withdraw; deliver a lightning
blow, seek a lightning decision. . .
In guerilla strategy,
the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots are his
vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked,
dispersed, exhausted and annihilated."1b
"After a period of
resistance, it is possible to increase the supply of equipment
by capturing it from the enemy."1c
. . .
[T]he fundamental axiom of combat
on which all military action is based. . . "Conservation of
one's own strength; destruction of enemy strength.""1d
"The movements of
guerilla troops must be secret and of supernatural
rapidity; the enemy must be taken unaware, and the action
entered speedily. . . The basic method is the attack
in a violent and deceptive form."1e
. . .
[T]he principle of concentration
of force against a relatively weaker enemy is
applicable to guerilla warfare."1f
is expressed in dispersion, concentration, and the alert
shifting of forces."1g
"We must not attack an
objective we are not certain of winning."1h
from Los Alamos.
. . .
[H]ow long it will take for another
nation to obtain the knowledge necessary to make atomic bombs . .
. . . [A]ny
one of several determined foreign nations could duplicate our work
in a period of about five years."1a
"Let us assume an H-bomb
releasing 1,000 times as much energy as the Hiroshima bomb. The
radius of destruction by blast from a bomb increases as the
cube root of the increase in the bomb's power. At Hiroshima
the radius of severe destruction was one mile. So an H-bomb
would cause almost complete destruction of buildings up to a
radius of 10 miles. By the blast effect alone a
single bomb could obliterate almost all of Greater New York
or Moscow or London . . .
"About 30 percent of the casualties in Hiroshima were
caused by flash burns . . . the H-bomb . . . would burn
people to death over a radius of up to 20 miles or more."1b
"I believe that in
a war fought with hydrogen bombs we would lose not
only many lives but all our liberties and human
values as well."1c
"I was one of the
scientists at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which
developed the atomic bomb during World War II. We thought at
the time that the United States might deploy a few dozen nuclear
weapons. Not in our worst nightmares did we imagine that
someday there would be about 10,000 strategic nuclear weapons in
the United States and a similar number in the Soviet Union. These
large numbers make no sense . . ."1d
. . .
[W]hy does the guerilla
fighter fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that
the guerilla fighter is a social reformer, that he
takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people
against their oppressors, and that he fights in order to
change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers
in ignominy and misery."1a
. . .
[W]hatever the ideological aims that may
inspire the fight, the economic aim is determined by the
aspiration toward ownership of land."1b
. . .
[N]o battle, combat, or
skirmish is to be fought unless it will be won."1c
. . .
[S]trategy is understood
as the analysis of the objectives to be achieved in
the light of the total military situation and the overall
ways of reaching these objectives."1d
. . .
[A]long with centers for study of
present and future zones of operations, intensive
popular work must be undertaken to explain the motives
of the revolution, its ends, and to spread the
incontrovertible truth that victory of the enemy against the
people is finally impossible. Whoever does not feel
this undoubted truth cannot be a guerilla fighter."1e
. . .
[T]actics are the
practical methods of achieving the grand strategic objectives."1f
inferiority of the guerilla makes it necessary that
always be carried out by surprise . . ."1g
"It is necessary
to distinguish clearly between sabotage, a
revolutionary and highly effective method of warfare, and
terrorism, a measure that is generally ineffective and
indiscriminate in its results . . ."1h
"One of the
characteristics of revolutionary propaganda must be
truth. Little by little, in this way,
masses will be won over."1i
Italics in the original.
1 Sun Tzu (c. 600-500 BC). The
Art of War. Translated and with an Introduction by
Samuel B. Griffith. With a Foreword by B.H. Liddell Hart. Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 1963. UNESCO Collection of
Representative Works Chinese Series.
a Ch. I ESTIMATES, v. 17, at 66.
b Ch. II WAGING WAR, v. 7, at 73.
c Ch III OFFENSIVE STRATEGY, v. 11, at 79.
d Ch. IV DISPOSITION, v. 5, at 85.
e Ch VIII THE NINE VARIABLES, v. 8, at 112.
f Ibid., v. 13, at 113.
g Ibid., v. 16, at 114.
h Ch IX MARCHES, v. 45, at 122.
i Ch X TERRAIN, v. 26, at 129.
j Ch XI THE NINE VARIETIES OF GROUND, v. 29, at 134.
k Ch XIII EMPLOYMENT OF SECRET AGENTS, v. 3, at 144.
l Ibid., v. 14, at 147.
The Peloponnesian War. The Complete Hobbes Translation.
With Notes and a New Introduction by
David Grene. The University of Michigan, 1959. David Grene, 1989.
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1989.
d The Third Book,
f The Sixth Book,
1 Niccolò Machiavelli
Prince (1531). Translated by Luigi Ricci. Revised by E.R.P. Vincent. Introduction by
Christian Gauss. New York, NY: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc.,
1952. (Reprint of a hardcover edition published by Oxford University Press, Inc.)
a Of Those Who Have Attained the Position of Prince by
Villainy, at 62..
b Of the Things for Which Men, and Especially Princes,
Are Praised or Blamed, at 84.
c Of Cruelty and Clemency, and Whether It Is Better to
Be Loved or Feared, at 90.
d In What Way Princes Must Keep Faith, at 93.
e Ibid., at 94.
2 Niccolò Machiavelli. The
Discourses. Edited with an Introduction by Bernard
Crick using the translation of Leslie J. Walker, S.J. Revisions by
Brian Richardson. Bernard Crick, 1970. London, UK: Penguin Books
Ltd. (Penguin Classics.)
a Book One, Discourse 37, at 200.
b Book One, Discourse 42, at 217.
c Book Two, Discourse 10, at 300 and 302.
d Book Two, Discourse 13, at 310.
e Book Three, Discourse 18, at 455.
1 Immanuel Kant. To Perpetual Peace: A
Philosophical Sketch (1795). Essay included in Immanuel
Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and
Moral Practice. Translated with an Introduction by Ted Humphrey.
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1983, at
Henri de Jomini
The Art of War.
With a new Introduction by Charles Messenger. Lionel Leventhal
Limited, 1992. Introduction, Charles Messenger, 1992. London, UK:
Greenhill Books, 1996. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996.
Art of War was first published in 1838 as
lï¿½Art de Guerre
(Paris) and was reprinted in 1855 ï¿½augmentee dï¿½un appendice.ï¿½
The English-language translation of 1862 (J.B. Lippincott & Co.,
Philadelphia) was reprinted in 1992 by
Greenhill Books, with an Introduction by
a Summary of the Art of War.
Definitions of the Branches of the Art of War, at 13.
b Chp. III. Strategy. Definition of Strategy and the
Fundamental Principle of War, at 69.
c Ibid., at 70.
Carl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831). On
War (1832). Edited and translated by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret. Introductory Essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and
Bernard Brodie. Commentary by Bernard Brodie. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976, 1984.
Notes by the Author on His Plans for Revising On War, at 69.
Book I: On the
Nature of War. What is
War?, at 75.
Book 3: On
Strategy in General.
Factors, at 184.
of Defense, at 357-359.
e Ibid. The Relationship
between Attack and Defense in Tactics, at 360.
f Ibid. Interaction
between Attack and Defense, at 377.
Book 8: War Plans. Closer Definition of the
Military Objective: The Defeat of the Enemy, at 596.
Ibid. The Plan of War designed to Lead to the
Total Defeat of the Enemy, at 618-619.
Carl Von Clausewitz. On War. Edited with an Introduction by
Anatol Rapoport. (Abridged edition of Clausewitz's magnum opus
based on the New and Revised Edition (edited by Col. F.N. Maude)
of Col. J.J. Graham's translation, 1908). London, UK: Penguin
Books Ltd., 1968.
Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf Von Moltke (1800-1891).
Charles E. Lindblom.
Moltke on the Art of
War: Selected Writings. Edited by
Daniel J. Hughes. Translated by Daniel J. Hughes and Harry Bell.
Foreword by Gunther E. Rothenberg. Daniel J. Hughes, 1993. New
York, NY: The Random House Ballantine Publishing Group.
One: The Nature of War, at
Two: Headquarters, Operations, Technology, at
Three: The Battle, at
NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2001. Unabridged republication of
the edition published by Schoken Books, New York, 1961.
a Chp. 5: Satyagraha or Passive
b Chp. 7:
The Theory and Practice of Satyagraha, 38.
c Chp. 47:
The Law of Suffering, 114.
d Chp. 58:
Non-Payment of Taxes, 140.
e Chp. 59:
Non-Payment of Taxes, 142.
f Chp. 70:
What It Is Not, 168.
166: The Satyagraha Way with Crime, 351.
Guerilla Warfare (Yu Chi Chan).
Translated from the Chinese and with an Introduction by Samuel B.
Griffith II. Samuel B. Griffith II, 1961. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois
a Ch. 1:What Is Guerilla
5: Organization for Guerilla Warfare. Equipment for Guerillas,
7: The Strategy of Guerilla Resistance Against Japan,
e Ibid., at 97.
Ibid., at 104.
Hans A. Bethe.
Road from Los Alamos.
The American Institute of Physics, 1991. New York, NY: Touchstone,
Simon and Schuster Inc., 1991.
Bomb. How Close Is the Danger? With Frederic Seitz, at 3
Bomb. The Hydrogen Bomb, at 15.
Freeze. Debate: Bethe vs. Teller, Response by Edward Teller, at
1 Che Guevara (1928-1967).
Guerilla Warfare. Introduction
by Marc Becker. Introduction, University of Nebraska Press, 1998.
Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998. (Originally
published: New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961.) (Guerilla
Warfare: A Method by Che Guevara. Reprinted from
Che: Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara,
edited with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P.
Valdes. The Massachusetts of Technology, 1969. Cambridge, MA: MIT
General Principles of Guerilla Warfare, at 10.
of the Guerilla Front,