Ludwig Wittgenstein
LUDWIG JOSEPH JOHAN WITTGENSTEIN  Macroknow Library
   

   
Philosophical Investigations.

" . . . Thought can be of what is not the case. . .
 
. . . Its essence, logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought. But this order, it seems,
must be utterly simple. It is prior to all experience, must run through all experience . . .
"1a*

"Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. -- Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. . .
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something -- ecause it is always before one's eyes.)
"1b

"When I obey a rule, I do not choose.
I obey the rule blindly.
"1c*

"(Lying is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other one.)"1d

"Does man think . . . because he has found that thinking pays? -- Because he thinks it advantageous to think?"1e

"The character of the belief in the uniformity of nature can perhaps be seen most clearly in the case in which we fear what we expect. Nothing could induce me to put my hand into a flame -- although after all it is only in the past that I have burnt myself.
The belief that fire will burn me is of the same kind as the fear that it will burn me.
I shall get burnt if I put my hand in the fire: that is
certainty. . .
"1f*


  
   
  

* Italics in the original.

1 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. The German text, with a revised English translation. 3rd ed. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1953, 1958, 2001.
a Remarks 95 and 97, at 38.
b Remarks 126 and 129, at 43.
c 
Remark 219, at 72.
d
 Remark 249, at 76.
e 
Remark 467, at 114.
f
 
Remarks 472-474, at 114.

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