Martin Heidegger
MARTIN HEIDEGGER  Macroknow Library
   

   
The Question Concerning Technology.

"The man who is deranged [Nietzsche's Madman who 'ran to the market place, and cried incessantly, "I seek God! I seek God!" . . . "Whither is God" . . . "I shall tell you. We have killed him - you and I"'1a] . . . has nothing in common with the kind of men standing about in the market place 'who do not believe in God.' For these men are not unbelievers because God as God has to them become unworthy of belief, but rather because they themselves have given up the possibility of belief, inasmuch as they are no longer able to seek God. They can no longer seek because they no longer think. Those standing about in the market place have abolished thinking and replaced it with idle babble that scents nihilism in every place in which it supposes it own opinion to be endangered."1* NIETZSCHE DRUCKER


   
   
Being and Time.

"The 'Being-true' . . . means . . . the entities of which one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden; that is, they must be discovered. Similarly, 'Being false' . . . amounts to deceiving in the sense of covering up [verdecken]: putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not."2* NEW TESTAMENT BADIOU
   


   
Pathmarks.

"The essence of truth reveals itself as freedom."3a* HEGEL

"That which alone and first of all is decisive is not which ideas and which values are posited, but rather the fact that the real is interpreted according to 'ideas' at all, that the 'world' is weighed according to 'values' at all."3b
   


   
The Principle of Reason.

"If this is the way it's going to be, may we give up what is worthy of thought in favor of the recklessness of exclusively calculative thinking and its immense achievements? Or are we obliged to find paths upon which thinking is capable of responding to what is worthy of thought instead of, enchanted by calculative thinking, mindlessly passing over what is worthy of thought?"4 AYOUB
   


   
The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.

"We need another logic solely because what is called logic is not a logic at all and has nothing in common anymore with philosophy."5a

"Only a free being can be unfree. . . only seldom do we exist freely."5b

"Being-free . . . is understanding oneself out of possibility."5c
    


   
The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.

". . . [A]lthough it objectively comprises a great wealth, mathematical knowledge is in itself, in terms of its content, the emptiest knowledge imaginable, and as such is at the same time the least binding for man. . ."6a

"Philosophy does not exist because there are sciences, but vice-versa: there can be sciences only because and only if there is philosophy."6b*

". . . [T]here must be no such circling and thus no circle in philosophy! This is, after all, a universal principle of logic. That is why all scientific philosophy prides itself on getting by without this circle. Yet anyone who has never been seized by dizziness in the presence of a philosophical question has never asked the question in a philosophical way, that is, has never entered the circle in the first place. The only thing that ordinary understanding can see in this circling motion is the movement around the periphery which always returns to its original point of departure on the periphery. Thus it misses the decisive issue here, which is an insight into the centre of the circle as such, an insight made possible in such a circling movement and this alone."6c

"Metaphysics -- metaphysical knowledge is a comprehensive questioning in this twofold sense: [1.] that beings as a whole are in each case conceptually included in every metaphysical question; and [2.] that whoever is involved in metaphysical questioning is in each case caught up in the question as well, and is fundamentally affected by the act of questioning and the object of questioning."6d


   
Ontology -- The Hermeneutics of Facticity.

" . . . [H]ermeneutics is the announcement and making known of the being of a being in its being in relation to . . . (me)."7a

"What hermeneutics is really meant to achieve is not merely taking cognizance of something and having knowledge about it, but rather an existential knowing, i.e., a being [ein Sein]. It speaks from out of interpretation and for the sake of it."7b

"History and philosophy are modes of interpretation, something which Dasein itself is, in which it lives . . . thus the genuine question of hermeneutics here turns out to be: what characteristic of the being of Dasein shows up in these modes of its having-itself?"7c

"As universal classification, philosophy encompasses the totality of culture, it is the system of cultural systems. But this totality is not itself examined as a theme in philosophy. The temporal is not itself investigated, but rather is that from out of which the classifying takes its point of departure, the point of departure for defining it in such a manner that it is inserted into a context of classification."7d POINCARÉ BADIOU

"The idea of knowledge . . . is thereby already sketched out in advance. The basic tendency of the comporting is classifying and filing away into . . . , i.e., something concrete is considered to be known when one has defined where it belongs, the place within the totality of the classificatory order whereinto it is to be inserted -- something is seen to be defined when it has been put away."7e POINCARÉ BATAILLE

" . . . [H]istorical consciousness, "history," and philosophy are at bottom not mere cultural goods which lie around in books . . . In both modes of interpretation, Dasein is encountering itself exactly as it is in itself, free of standpoints. Historical consciousness lets Dasein be encountered in the entire wealth of the objective being of its having-been, while philosophy lets it be encountered in the immutability of its always-being-in-such-a-manner. Both directions of interpretation bring Dasein itself before its highest and pure present."7f

"Mathematics is the least rigorous of disciplines, because it is the one easiest to gain access to. The human sciences presuppose much more scientific existence than could ever be achieved by a mathematician."7g

"Caring is "being"-in-a-world and should not be interpreted as an act of consciousness."7h


   
Nietzsche.

"The gateway 'Moment' . . . is the image of time running forward and backward into eternity. Time itself is viewed from the 'moment,' from the 'now.' Both ways find their point of departure here, one extending into the not-yet-now of the future, the other leading back into the no-longer-now of the past."8a OLD TESTAMENT BUDDHA AUGUSTINE HEGEL NIETZSCHE

"What is the pervasive character of the world? The answer is 'force.' What is force? . . . What Nietzsche calls 'force' becomes clear to him . . . as 'will to power.'"8b NIETZSCHE

"The guiding question of Western philosophy is, 'What is being?'"8c ARISTOTLE

"According to Plato's teaching . . . the essence of thinking resides in the soul's solitary conversation with itself."8d PLATO HEGEL


 
       

* Italics in the original.

1 Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Translated and with an Introduction by William Lovitt. New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1977. [See Part II: The Word of Nietzsche: "God Is Dead," especially pp. 59-60 and p. 112].
a Friedrich Nietzsche. The Gay Science. The translation of The Madman (section no. 125) is from Walter Kaufmann's The Portable Nietzsche (New York, NY: Viking 1968), at 95-96.

2 Martin Heidegger. Being and Time. A translation of Sein und Zeit (7th ed., Neomarius Verlag, T�bingen) by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated, 1962 [HarperSanFrancisco]. (The Concept of the Logos, at 55-58.)

3 Martin Heidegger. Pathmarks. Edited by William McNeill. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Originally published as Wegmarken by Vittorio Klostermann GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 1967.
a On the Essence of Truth, translated by John Sallis, at 136-154. (Originally published in Marting Heidegger: Basic Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell (2nd revised and expanded ed.) (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1993), at 115-138.)
b Plato's Doctrine of Truth, translated by Thomas Sheehan, at 155-182.

4 Martin Heidegger. The Principle of Reason. Translated by Reginald Lilly. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, at 129.

5 Martin Heidegger. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Translated by Michael Heim. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984.
a On the Traditional conception of logic, at 5.
b Freedom and World, at 191, and Transcendence and Temporality (Nihil Originarum), at 199.
c Transcendence Temporalizing Itself in Temporality and the Essence of Ground, at 215.

6 Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. Translated By William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995. Published in German as Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt -- Endlichkeit -- Einsamkeit. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982, 1992.
a Part One. Chapter Two: Ambiguity in the Essence of Philosophy (Metaphysics), at 17.
b
Ibid., at 22.
c
Part Two. Chapter Two The Beginning of Metaphysical Questioning with the Question of World. The Path of the Investigation and Its Difficulties: , at 180.
d
Ibid., at 180-1
.

7 Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). Ontology -- The Hermeneutics of Facticity. Translated by John van Buren. Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1988. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999. [Published in German as Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, volume 63: Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität), edited by Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns.]
PART ONE: PATHS OF INTERPRETING THE BEING-THERE OF DASEIN IN THE AWHILENESS OF TEMPORAL PARTICULARITY
a Chapter 1: Hermeneutics, at 7.
b Ibid., at 14.
c Chapter 3: Being-Interpreted in Today's Today, at 39.
d Chapter 4: Analysis of Each Interpretation Regarding Its Mode of Being-Related to Its Object, at 47.
e Ibid., at 48.
f Ibid., at 51.
PART TWO: THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PATH OF THE HERMENEUTICS OF FACTICITY
g Chapter 1: Preliminary Reflections: Phenomenon and Phenomenology, at 56-57.
h Chapter 4: Significance as the Character of the World's Being-Encountered, at 79.

8 Martin Heidegger. Nietzsche. Volume I: The Will to Power as Art. Translated with Notes and an Analysis by David Farrell Krell. Volume II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same. Translated with Notes and an Analysis by David Farrell Krell. San Francisco, CA: HaperSanFrancisco, 1991. (Originally published: San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1979-1987.)
a Volume II, Part 1, On the Vision of the Riddle, at 41.
b Volume II, Part 1, Summary Presentation of the Thought: Being as a Whole as Life and Force; the World as Chaos, at 86-87.
c Volume II, Part 1, The Essence of a Fundamental Metaphysical Position; The Possibility of Such Positions in the History of Western Philosophy, at 192.
d Volume II, Part 2: Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra, at 218.

9 Martin Heidegger. Nietzsche. Volume III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics. Translated by Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell, and Frank A. Capuzzi. Edited with Notes and an Analysis by David Farrell Krell.
Volume IV: Nihilism. Translated by Frank A. Capuzzi. Edited with Notes and an Analysis by David Farrell Krell.

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